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Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process
And the Right of Abortion
By NoRMAN VIEmA*
FOR most students of the Supreme Court the primary significance
of the decisions invalidating criminal abortion laws1 lies in their elimi-
nation of the risk of prosecution for terminating a pregnancy or, from
a different perspective, in their elimination of legal protection for the
fetus during a substantial period of its development. This no doubt
is a matter of great social importance which deserves close attention;
but the decisions appear also to mark a re-emergence of the doctrine
of substantive due process and have independent significance for that
reason. This doctrine, which had been dormant for the better part
of a quarter of a century, carries major implications for judicial review
of substantive matters outside the Bill of Rights and hence for the
institutional integrity of the Court itself.2 It is that aspect of the cases
which I propose to examine. This article will begin by setting out
the Court's position on criminal abortion laws. It will then attempt
to scrutinize the specific finding of a right of abortion and to place
that finding in perspective in relation to the history of substantive due
process. Finally, it will conclude with a brief reflection on the future
of substantive due process.
The Facts and the Opinions
In Roe v. Wade3 a pregnant woman sought declaratory and in-
* A.B., 1959, Columbia University; J.D., 1962, University of Chicago.
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
2. Some of the most severe challenges to the Court's integrity have arisen as
a result of excessive judicial intervention into areas not explicitly protected by the Con-
stitution. See, e.g., R. JAcKSON, THE STRUGGLE, FOp, JUDIcIAL SuPREMACY (1941) [here-
inafter cited as R. JAcKsON], which sets forth the events and decisions leading to Presi-
dent Roosevelt's court-packing plan. The Court survived the challenge of the 1930's
by beating a hasty retreat on its due process and commerce clause interpretations. See
text accompanying notes 35-37 infra.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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junctive relief against the enforcement of a Texas statute which made
it a crime to procure an abortion except for the purpose of saving
the life of the prospective mother. Related claims were filed by a
physician and a married couple, but the Court did not reach the merits
of those disputes.4 Doe v. Bolton,5 a companion case, was an action
by a pregnant woman and several other parties for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the enforcement of Georgia laws regulating
the grounds on which pregnancies could be terminated and limiting
lawful abortions to those performed on Georgia residents in accredited
hospitals, with the approval of a special committee and two additional
physicians.
The Court, after abruptly disposing of a number of difficult pre-
liminary issues,6 turned in Roe to the plaintiffs contention that a right
of abortion is conferred in at least one of these constitutional sources:
the due process clause, the ninth amendment or the privacy guarantees
of the Bill of Rights and its penumbra.7 Mr. Justice Blackmun, writ-
ing for a 7-2 majority, began by exploring the legal history of abortion
in the western world. Abortion, he said, had been practiced in the
Greek and Roman Empires, and such restrictions as were imposed
upon the practice were intended for parental, rather than fetal, protec-
tion. At common law "abortion performed before 'quickening'-the
first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually
from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy-was not an indictable
offense."8  It was not until well into the nineteenth century that the
destruction of a prequickened fetus was made criminal in the United
States. Justice Blackmun found three objectives which might underlie
the enactment of modern abortion laws:9 (1) deterrence of illicit sex-
ual behavior, (2) avoidance of hazardous medical procedures, and (3)
protection of the unborn. The first of those interests was not seriously
advanced in Roe,10 and so the Court focused on the two other objec-
tives: "It is with these interests, and the weight attached to them,"
wrote Justice Blackmun, "that this case is concerned.""
4. Id. at 125-29.
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
6. In rapid order the Court brushed aside serious problems of federalism, moot-
ness, and standing. I will resist the temptation to examine those problems since they
do not bear on the doctrine of substantive due process.
7. 410 U.S. at 129.
8. Id. at 132.
9. Id. at 147-52.
10. Id. at 148.
11. ld. at 152.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
March 19741 DUE PROCESS AND ABORTION
The Court noted the absence of any mention of a right to privacy
in the Constitution, but it took comfort in the fact that some Justices
had discovered "at least the roots of that right' 2 in the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments and in the penumbra of the
Bill of Rights. Having paid its respects to the constitutional text, the
majority then addressed itself to the relationship between privacy and
the specific issue of abortion. A single paragraph announced the
Court's disposition of the issue and the reasons found to support it:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court deter-
mined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the peo-
ple, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State
would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice
altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diag-
nosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life
and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there
is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as
in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of un-
wed motherhood may be involved.' 3
Given the state's interest "in maintaining medical standards, and
protecting potential life,"' 4 the right to terminate a pregnancy would
be subject to some qualifications. But the Court said that "[w]here
certain 'fundamental rights' are involved . . .regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a 'compelling interest.' "' Abortion
was evidently one of those "certain" fundamental rights,' 6 though Mr.
Justice Blackmun did not think it worthwhile to explain why. In-
stead, he undertook to pinpoint the stage at which the government's
interests become sufficiently compelling to justify regulation. His con-
clusion was that beginning at the end of the first trimester the state
could regulate abortions in the interest of maternal health, and that
beginning with the viability of the fetus it could prohibit abortions in
order to protect potential life, provided the mother's health would not
be endangered. 17  Viability was deemed a compelling point "because
12. Id.
13. Id. at 153.
14. Id. at 154.
15. Id. at 155.
16. Id. at 162-64.
17. Id. at 164-65.
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the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside
the mother's womb";"8 the end of the first trimester was critical be-
cause until that stage "mortality in abortion is less than mortality in
normal childbirth."' 9  Finally, in Doe v. Bolton,2 ° the Court struck
down Georgia's requirement that abortions be performed only in ac-
credited hospitals, on approval by committee and two additional physi-
cians, and be available only to Georgia residents. The residence re-
quirement ran afoul of the interstate privileges and immunities clause.
The other requirements were unduly restrictive of the right recognized
in Roe and were lacking in adequate justification.
Substantive Due Process and the Right of Abortion
The central decisions in Roe were (1) that the due process clause
is a repository of substantive rights not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution but deemed worthy of protection by a majority of the
Court, and (2) that the freedom to terminate a pregnancy during the
first three months is one of those rights. Since the latter ruling can
teach a great deal about the soundness of the former, I shall address
the abortion question in some detail. However, it seems apparent at
the outset that the first of these two propositions is fully capable of
resurrecting the discredited regime of Lochner v. New York.Y In
order to appreciate the far-reaching implications of such a develop-
ment, it will be useful to review the earlier cases on substantive due
process before examining the abortion decisions.
The dismal history of substantive due process during the first
third of this century has been frequently recounted 22 and requires only
brief recapitulation. During that period courts freely substituted their
judgment for the legislature's on a wide variety of subjects. "Rates
set by public-utility commissions were disallowed as confiscatory.
Statutes regulating working conditions were held to impair 'liberty of
contract.' Taxes were invalidated."23  The results were not always
destructive of regulatory authority, "but this only emphasize[d] the
fact that the Court, and not the legislature became the final judge
of what might be law . , Women's working hours could be
18. Id. at 163.
19. Id.
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22. See generally R. JACKSON, supra note 2.
23. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U.
Cm. L. Rtv. 1, 5 (1964).
24. R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 70.
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regulated,25 but their rates of pay could not.26 Men had a constitu-
tional right to work for more than ten hours per day in a bakery,
27
but they could be prohibited from working more than eight in a coal
mine. 28  Prices might or might not be regulated, depending on
whether courts believed the matter was "affected with a public inter-
est." Fire insurance companies 9 and tobacco warehouses30 appar-
ently met this "test," but gasoline distributors31 and employment agen-
cies3 2 did not. In the field of labor-management relations the gov-
ernment could not protect employees against being discharged for join-
ing a union3 3 and could not refuse to protect employers against picket-
ing or boycotts by employees.34
This untenable line of decisions came to a precipitate halt during
the New Deal years. In one field after another-labor law, price con-
trol, taxation-the law turned 180 degrees. 35  Substantive due proc-
ess, which had once threatened vast areas of social and economic leg-
islation, became a "last resort of constitutional arguments. '36 By 1963
the Court seemed prepared to bury the doctrine for all time:
We refuse to sit as a "super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of
legislation," and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time
when courts used the Due Process Clause "to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a peculiar
school of thought."
37
However, the temptation for the Court "to weigh 'the wisdom of leg-
islation" remained great. Sometimes heroic efforts were made to ex-
tend the cloak of the Bill of Rights to matters only tangentially related
to enumerated liberties in order to avoid reliance on substantive due
process.38 In other instances the Court responded to the problem of
25. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
26. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
27. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
28. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
29. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
30. Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).
31. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
32. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
33. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908).
34. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
35. See generally R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 197-285; W. LocKHART, Y. KYi-
sAR & J. CHOPER, CASES ON CoNsTrrDTIONAL .Aw 461-63 (3d ed. 1970).
36. Buckv. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
37. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
38. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962). See note 65 infra.
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finding a constitutional source for unenumerated rights by pretending
the problem did not exist." Finally, in Roe the Court returned to
the doctrine of substantive due process in undisguised form.
The obvious question then is whether Roe, unlike its predeces-
sors, can withstand inspection or, stated more generally, whether sub-
stantive due process is now a defensible constitutional principle. In
dealing with that question it is important to bear in mind the factors
which brought the doctrine into disrepute. The problem was not
merely the inconsistency of result in the Court's actions; this indeed
seems only symptomatic of the real difficulty. The root problem with
substantive due process was the absence of adequate standards for de-
termining which of the values not explicitly safeguarded by the consti-
tutional text are nevertheless entitled to special protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is difficult enough to fix the proper scope
of the Bill of Rights.40 But if certain unenumerated liberties are to
be given special constitutional protection while others are not, some
basis must be found for determining which freedoms are entitled to
such protection and which are entrusted to the fortunes of the political
processes. 4 It was this challenge which the old Court never met,
and I feel it necessary to say that the modem Court was equally un-
successful in Roe v. Wade.
The dominant issue in Roe was whether there is a constitutional
right to terminate a pregnancy. The Court's affirmative response
rested essentially on this line of reasoning: The constitutional right
39. "We have no occasion to ascribe the source of [the] right to travel interstate
to a particular constitutional provision." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630
(1969).
40. The language and history of the first eight amendments give some guidance
to the courts which is lacking in the substantive due process cases. At the same time
the express mandate of the amendments makes close judicial scrutiny relatively easy to
justify in these areas.
41. A large part of the problem is precisely the special protection which due
process cases have afforded to unenumerated rights that the Court deems "fundamen-
tal." A due process requirement of rationality might well produce no greater intrusion
into the legislative domain than that requirement has generated in equal protection
cases. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974); see also B.
SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A TEXTBOOK 168 (1970). But the Court has
decided-explicitly in Roe and implicitly in Lochner-that rational government actions
are sometimes invalid, absent compelling justification. This approach necessarily
requires the formulation of suitable standards for determining which of our im-
portant liberties merit special solicitude and which do not. Compare the Court's
close scrutiny of racial classifications, which avoids this problem by drawing no distinc-
tion between "fundamental" and non-fundamental rights. See generally Vieira, Racial
Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67 MICH. L. REV.
1553 (1969).
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of privacy "has some extension"'42 to activities relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing; anti-
abortion laws impose a detriment on pregnant women; therefore, the
right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."43  No elaborate discus-
sion is required to expose the glaring non sequitur in the Court's argu-
ment. Plainly the fact that some family matters are constitutionally
protected does not demonstrate that abortion is constitutionally pro-
ected. Nor does the added fact that abortion laws disadvantage preg-
nant women establish their invalidity. Legal restrictions are placed
on family autonomy in fields ranging from divorce to euthanasia de-
spite the heavy costs thereby exacted from the individuals concerned.
Perhaps because the Court recognized this, it put great emphasis on
historical evidence suggesting that restrictive abortion laws "are of rel-
atively recent vintage."4
But the history of abortion control cannot serve to distinguish
other areas of private life which -the states have continued to regulate.
First, the historical record on abortion is more ambivalent than the
Court acknowledged. In some jurisdictions the destruction of even
a prequickened fetus was an offense at common law.45  Furthermore,
as Roe concedes, the significance attached to quickening in other
states "appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier philo-
sophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life
begins." 46  Such an unsupported concept-that life begins when
movement of the fetus is felt by a pregnant woman-is surely not
entitled in the twentieth century to constitutionally mandated defer-
ence from the legislative branches.
Second, the common law of crimes, even when uninfluenced by
outdated assumptions, would hardly be a suitable measure of constitu-
tional power. Many private activities which were tolerated at common
law have been brought under government regulation by statutes which,
until now, have not been deemed unconstitutional. Some homosexual
acts, for example, were unregulated at common law.48 The same
42. 410 U.S. at 152.
43. Id. at 153.
44. Id. at 129.
45. E.g. Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631 (1850).
46. 410 U.S. at 133.
47. The detection of fetal movement depends to a considerable degree on the sen-
sitivity of the pregnant woman. "Mothers with experience from previous pregnancies
may . . . be able to recognize the fetus kicking" four or six weeks earlier than other
women. R. CooKE, THE TERRIBLE CHOIcE: THE ABORTION DILEM1M 37 (1968).
48. See R. PERKNs, CRnmNAL LAw 390_(2d ed. 1969).
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holds true for gambling4" as well as for adultery and fornication. 50
But perhaps the best example of government regulation of "recent
vintage" in an area of private conduct is provided by state and federal
drug laws. Until about 1870 there were virtually no legal restrictions
on narcotics traffic.51 Even when such restrictions became widespread
early in the twentieth century, they were usually directed at distribu-
tion or sale and did not prohibit mere possession.52 Marijuana controls
came still later, appearing for the most part between 1914 and 1937. 51
Yet cannabis, opium, cocaine and morphine had been in use in the
United States many years earlier.54 In short, there was for a substan-
tial period of time a "right" to use drugs, just as there may have been
a right to destroy a prequickened fetus. Moreover, the denial of ac-
cess to some drugs is arguably detrimental to persons already addicted
to them. The stigma, the possible harm, and the "distressful life and
future" which Roe attempted to forestall will await many addicts who
are deprived of their supply of narcotics. This of course is not to
suggest that abortion and drug abuse are indistinguishable. My point
is simply that the logic of Roe, which relied on common law history
and on the detrimental effects of antiabortion laws, is applicable to
many other areas of private life, some of which have never been sus-
pected of entitlement to constitutional status. No doubt the Court
could try to distinguish abortion from drug abuse by weighing the in-
terests which the respective statutes promote. But it is far from cer-
tain that a careful analysis of these interests would reveal differences
of constitutional dimension. Indeed, many people would contend that
the protection of potential life is more important than the interests
served by many of our drug laws. 55
Finally, the Court's identification of the "compelling" point for
asserting state interests is no less difficult to justify than the general
49. J. BISHOP, STATUTORY CRIMES § 843, at 558-59 (3d ed. 1901).
50. "Adultery and fornication were punished by the Church as ecclesiastical of-
fenses, but were not recognized as common-law crimes .... " R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAw 377 (2d ed. 1969) (italics omitted).
51. U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY, STATE LAWS RELATING TO THE CONTROL OF NAR-
coTIc DRUGS AND THE TREATMENT OF DRUG ADDICTION 1-2 (1931).
52. Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An
Inquiry Into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv.
971, 986 (1970).
53. Id. at 1010.
54. See generally R. BLUM, SOCIETY AND DRUGS (1969).
55. Restrictions on the use of marijuana have been subjected to especially sharp
attack, but even the criminalization of "hard" drugs like heroin has been criticized as
being counter-productive. See generally J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA-THE NEW PROHIBI-
TION (1970); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 332-42 (1968).
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finding of a right of abortion. The selection of the end of the first
trimester as the point for safeguarding health interests is plausible
enough insofar as physical risks are involved. But it ignores the state's
concern for the pyschological health of women contemplating abortion,
a concern which does not necessarily vary in intensity with the stage
of pregnancy at which abortion is performed.56 And the choice of
viability as the constitutionally permissible point for protecting the un-
born seems utterly arbitrary. It is difficult to see how either the wom-
an's interests or -those of the fetus would significantly change at via-
bility. The fact that the fetus could survive outside the womb is
quite irrelevant, since that will not be the alternative to abortion.
Rather, the alternative will be to compel the woman to carry the fetus
for several months. If this compulsion is justified in the interest of
permitting a viable fetus to develop into an infant, it is unclear why
a similar compulsion could not be justified to permit an embryo to
develop into a viable fetus. The Court apparently values potential
life less than it does the freedom of women in early stages of preg-
nancy and more than it does the freedom of women in late stages
of pregnancy. But nowhere in its lengthy opinion did the Court ade-
quately explain why state legislatures which happen not to share these
values should be constitutionally required to conform to them.
57
Nor was the Court persuasive in its astonishing venture into the
field of public health. In Doe v. Bolton the requirements of hospital
accreditation by JCAH58 and of committee supervision in abortion
cases were struck down because no other medical or surgical proce-
dure was similarly burdened:
56. There is a strong current of professional opinion emphasizing the likeli-
hood of adverse psychological consequences [of abortion]. One psychiatrist has gone
so far as to insist that. .. any abortion (except perhaps those performed to terminate
pregnancies resulting from rape or incest) is likely to produce serious and adverse psy-
chic aftereffects." E. ScnuR, CRImsS WrrouTr VicriMs 41 (1965).
57. A commentator has attempted to distinguish embryonic life this way:
"[Mluch that we associate with the value of human life is not present at the earliest
stages. There is no feeling nor thought of which we know. There is no reciprocal
relationship to others that is reflected in need or love. There is no memory or fear."
Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53
B.U.L. REv. 765, 776 (1973) (emphasis added). But such conjecture over pre-natal
feeling is scarcely an appropriate basis for overturning the legislative judgments of more
than forty states. In the terminal stages of some illnesses there may also be a lack
of feeling and thought. Yet the prohibition against taking life in these circumstances,
while often criticized as unwise, has never been thought to be unconstitutional.
58. JCAH, the Joint Commission on Accrediation of Hospitals, is a private organ-
ization operated for the purpose of establishing standards that will afford quality med-
ical care. JCAH, AccmrrATioN MANuAL FOR Hosprra.s 1-2 (1970).
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[T]here is no restriction of the performance of nonabortion sur-
gery in a hospital not yet accredited by the JCAH so long as other
requirements imposed by the State, such as licensing of the hos-
pital and of the operating surgeon are met.5 9
Yet the Court went on to announce that a wholly nondiscriminatory
requirement of hospitalization alone, as distinguished from hospitaliza-
tion in a JCAH accredited institution, would also be invalid.60 The
latter ruling was not based on any finding that abortion would other-
wise be singled out for disadvantageous treatment; many states might
choose to require hospitalization for abortions in common with other
medical or surgical activities. What the Court was saying instead was
that the government is constitutionally required to exempt abortions
from general measures which are validly applied to other medical pro-
cedures. It was thus the Court, and not the state, which in this regard
was demanding differential treatment for abortion. In so doing the
majority was simply imposing upon the states its own medical opinions
concerning the "adequacy" of various facilities to the purpose at hand.
Discussion of the Court's qualifications to pass on medical questions
or of its fact-finding abilities as compared to those of the legislature
was conspicuously, though not surprisingly, absent. The Court was
similarly silent as to why the interests of a viable fetus must in every
case be subordinated to a pregnant woman's interest in "life or
health."'" A decision to protect a woman's life, or even to prevent
major risks to her health, would command wide support, at least if
the decision were made through the political processes and hence re-
mained subject to majoritarian control. But does it follow that all
health interests of the woman, no matter how insignificant they might
be, must as a matter of constitutional law override the interest of fetal
life? This judicial broadside, like so many others in the abortion
cases, was totally devoid of reasoned exposition.
The deficiencies in these opinions would be less disturbing if they
were peculiar to the disposition of the abortion problem. Unfortu-
nately, however, the loose reasoning in Doe and Roe is not merely
an aberrational by-product which can be charged to the pressures of
time or to the limitations of the opinion writer. The cases were under
advisement in the Supreme Court for six months during the 1971
Term and then were reargued during the 1972 Term. The weak-
nesses of the opinions are weaknesses which have inhered from the
59. 410 U.S. at 193.
60. Id. at 195.
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (emphasis added).
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beginning in the philosophy of Lochner v. New York. The values
of the judges have changed; the old struggle to measure the scope
of the liberty of contract has given way to a search for the compelling
point in the life of a fetus. But Roe, like Lochner, provides no real
basis for containing the doctrine of substantive due process. The cru-
cial problem of devising standards for determining which unenumer-
ated freedoms are entitled to special protection remains as intractable
as ever. There is no way of knowing why abortion is entitled to such
protection but consensual homosexuality, let us say, is not. And
there is no reason to believe that the problem of inadequate stand-
ards, which continues to resist solution after seventy-five years of judi-
cial effort, will be overcome in the foreseeable future. Yet we are
admonished by experience that without such standards decision-mak-
ing in this field will be a product of judicial intuition and nothing more.
Thus, the careless reasoning in Doe and Roe is distressing, not be-
cause of what it did to antiabortion laws, but because it shows that
substantive due process decisions are as unprincipled today as they
were during the unhappy season of Lochner v. New York.
6
1
The Future of Substantive Due Process
The history of substantive due process-running from judicial ab-
stention 3 to heavy-handed intervention and back again-cautions
against the issuance of extravagant prediotions in this area. It is pos-
sible at most to speculate on the prospects for renewed use of the doctrine
in the immediate future. Any analysis of the longer term must await
the disposition of claims which will be brought to test the elasticity of
Roe and Doe.
Even short-term prospects are difficult to gauge. I have sug-
gested above that Roe is susceptible to an expansive interpretation
reminiscent of the worst excesses of -the Lochner era. But inade-
quately reasoned opinions are characteristically as vulnerable as they
62. Attempts are sometimes made to distinguish between the economic freedoms
protected during the Lochner era and the personal freedoms now thought to be entitled
to special judicial favor. But the Court itself seems to have despaired of this distinc-
tion, finding that "the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one" and that such a distinction would be almost impossible to apply. Lynch
v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). There may be a stylistic differ-
ence between Roe and Lochner in that the latter case purported to apply a rationality
test, while the former candidly asserted a power to invalidate reasonable regulations.
But the extent of actual interference with the legislative process is substantially the
same in each case.
63. See note 74 infra.
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are threatening. Precisely because such opinions have not been prop-
erly explained, they can either be greatly expanded or severely re-
stricted in future cases. So it is with Roe and Doe. Those cases,
though explicitly invoking substantive due process, also relied on the
right of privacy which the Court had previously held to be protected
by the Bill of Rights.64 It is conceivable, therefore, that the abortion
decisions may be viewed in the future as being controlled by the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights. Under this interpretation the decisions
would add relatively little, other than the specific right of abortion,
to what had been decided in Griswold v. Connecticut.65 Alternatively,
it is possible that the Court will merely choose to limit unprincipled
decisions in an unprincipled way.66 The uniqueness of pregnancy
would facilitate this action by lending an air of authenticity to a deci-
sion limiting Roe to its facts.
Strong support for restricting judicial intervention can be found
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.67 The ques-
tion in that case was whether an educational financing system in which
the amount of spending in each school district depended largely on
local property tax revenues, and consequently varied throughout the
state, was unconstitutional. The issue was cast in terms of equal pro-
tection, but the claim presented was basically one of substantive due
process. 68 The Court held that, despite the inequalities in this financ-
ing scheme, the system is rationally based and the Constitution re-
quires no more. 69 In turning back this challenge, the Court resisted
a carefully orchestrated effort to repackage substantive due process
in a more attractive mold. The majority, while not disclaiming Four-
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
65. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold had established the technique of protecting
unenumerated freedoms by first giving an extravagant construction to the Bill of Rights
and then making that construction applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. This might seem a circuitous route to the same result which substantive
due process achieves; but in fact there may be a significant, if subtle, difference be-
tween (1) extrapolating unenumerated freedoms from the Bill of Rights-a process in
which history and the constitutional text can exert a restraining influence-and (2)
giving special protection to judicially selected freedoms which have no constitutional
roots.
66. The Court's familiarity with this stratagem has been well documented. See
Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 Sup. CT. REv. 181
(1973); Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971
Sup. Cr. RFv. 265 (1971).
67. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
68. See Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 17 n.25 (1969).
69. 411 U.S. at 54-55.
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teenth Amendment protection for unenumerated freedoms, limited
strict judicial scrutiny to rights which are safeguarded by the Constitu-
tion explicitly or implicitly, and it held that the right to an education
is not constitutionally protected.7 ° Other cases have indicated that
housing7' and welfare benefits72 are similarly unprotected. The up-
shot of this line of decisions may be that, at least where substantial
government appropriations would be required, judicial intrusions to
safeguard unenumerated liberties will be fairly limited. The decisions
may thus suggest that the Court, as presently constituted, intends no
radical expansion of substantive due process.73
Perhaps the most likely course for the immediate future would
involve a sporadic use of the due process clause in "hard" cases which
do not admit of the Court's desired result through the enforcement
of enumerated constitutional rights.1 4 The problem, of course, is that
once unleashed the doctrine of substantive due process cannot be eas-
ily controlled. The Lochner phase of due process also had a modest
beginning,75 but in time it assumed catastrophic proportions. We are,
one would suppose, less likely to travel that road after our experience
with it the first time around. But there are those who believe that
there was nothing wrong with Lochner except that it protected some-
one else's values instead of their own. That unfortunate attitude can
be detected in Roe v. Wade. It is not negated, though its conse-
quences will be diminished, by Rodriguez and similar decisions. In
any case one must surely question the soundness of a doctrine calling
for judicial restraint except where five Justices feel strongly about the
matter. Such a doctrine has meant, and probably must continue to
mean, essentially unprincipled decision-making.
70. Id. at 35-40.
71. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
72. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
73. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S.Ct. 791 (:1974), invoking a
rationality test, rather than "strict scrutiny," against mandatory maternity leaves for
public school teachers. See note 41 supra.
74. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
75. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMisAR, & J. CHOPER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw, 454-56 (3d ed. 1970).
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